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CURRENT TRENDS IN PREGNANCY BENEFITS-
1972 EEOC GUIDELINES INTERPRETED
The last decade has witnessed significant changes in the area of
women's rights, starting with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 On the
judicial front, the United States Supreme Court has encouraged the
feminist movement through its interpretation of the equal protection2 and
due process3 clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Overshadow-
ing these developments is the proposed Equal Rights Amendment4 to the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000 a-h (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975a-d, 2000c, e, h (Supp. II, 1973). The Act contains ten specific titles. The
most significant to women's rights is Title VIi, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970),
as amended, Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq. (Supp. II, 1973), which forbids employment discrimination based on sex. For a
comprehensive discussion of this provision, prior to the 1972 amendment, see Miller,
Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV.
877 (1967).
2. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which a federal statute
granting automatic dependency allowances and medical benefits to married male
air force officers was held to violate equal protection as incorporated in the fifth
amendment's due process clause; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which the
Court, basing its decision on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
struck down an Idaho statute which gave preference to males over females in the
issuance of letters of administration where a male and a female were similarly
situated. Both Frontiero and Reed have provoked considerable discussion concerning
the extent to which the equal protection clause of the Constitution prohibits sex
discrimination. See, e.g., Comment, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: An
Analysis of Constitutional Approaches to Achieve Equal Rights for Women, 38
ALBANY L. REV. 66 (1973).
3. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974), in which the
Court held that the arbitrary or capricious mandatory pregnancy leave policies of
two school systems violated the due process clause "because of their use of un-
warranted conclusive presumptions that seriously burden the exercise of protected
constitutional liberty." 94 S. Ct. at 801. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For discussions of the
ramifications of this proposed amendment, see Martin, Equal Rights Amendment,
An Overview, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1972); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
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United States Constitution, which to date has 'been ratified by the legis-
latures of thirty-three states. 5
This activity has also involved the rights of pregnant employees.
While the United States Supreme Court has held that a school board
cannot arbitrarily require a pregnant teacher to take maternity leave
four to five months prior to her delivery, 6 the Court has also held that
a state disability program can constitutionally exclude benefits for nor-
mal pregnancies. 7  The extent to which private employers can be com-
pelled to provide pregnancy benefits in their disability insurance plans
is still unsettled. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission8
(EEOC) has promulgated guidelines9 requiring -private employers to treat
pregnancy in the same manner as other temporary disabilities "under
any health or disability insurance . . . plan . . . ."0 The validity of
these guidelines interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is uncertain
since it is questionable whether it is discrimination because of sex to ex-
clude pregnancy from health insurance programs.
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871 (1971). See also additional works listed in DAVIDSON, GINSBURG &
KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 107-08 (1974).
5. Interview with E.R.A. Central, Chicago, Oct. 8, 1974. Thirty-eight state
legislatures must ratify the Equal Rights Amendment for adoption. U.S. Const. art.
V.
6. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974).
7. Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974). This case is discussed at pp. 134-
38 infra.
8. The EEOC was created under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-4(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1973) to administer Title VII of the Act.
9. § 1604.10. Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes
from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima
facie violation of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage,
abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes,
temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any heal'th or
temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with
employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices in-
volving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the avail-
ability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privi-
leges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability
due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are
applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is
available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact
on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.10(a)-(c) (1973) [hereinafter referred to as guidelines].
10. Id. at § 1604.10(b).
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The Supreme Court will most likely be asked to rule on the validity of
the guidelines, since several recent lower court decisions" dealing with
this issue have reached opposite conclusions. This Comment will con-
sider these guidelines which mandate that an employer provide the same
supplementary compensation for pregnant employees as are provided
for other employees who suffer a disability.
12
ORIGIN OF THE GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY BENEFITS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
8
To aid in the administration of Title VII, the Act created the EEOC which
is empowered to issue guidelines to interpret the meaning and applica-
tion of the Act.14
The guidelines issued on April 5, 1972, treating pregnancy as a dis-
ability that must be included under an employer's benefit program, marked
a radical change from the EEOC's prior position. In 1966, the General
Counsel of the EEOC issued opinion letters which sanctioned the prac-
tice of excluding pregnancy from disability insurance coverage.' 5 This
11. Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 2 CCH EMP. PRACT.
G. (8 EPD) 9615, at 5637 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1974) (benefits denied).
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (benefits
allowed); Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2 CCH EMp. PRAc. G. (7 EPD)
9154, at 6824 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1973) (benefits denied); Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., Civil No. 142-72-R (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 1974) (benefits allowed). See
also Elliott & Turner Co., 73 C-1155 (Dec. 12, 1973), decided by the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission. In Elliott, the FEPC decided that the complain-
ants were entitled to pregnancy benefits under state guidelines analogous to those
of the EEOC.
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973).
13. § 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices-Employer practices
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. 11, 1973).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970).
15. One such opinion letter stated:
[T]he Commission policy with respect to pregnancy does not seek to com-
pare an employer's treatment of illness or injury with his treatment of
maternity, since maternity is a temporary disability unique to the female
1,9741
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policy was further reaffirmed in a later EEOC decision.' 6 There was
no further treatment of the subject until an EEOC decision summarily
found that the denial of disability benefits for pregnancy was discrimina-
tory.17 Despite this rather unexpected holding, the EEOC remained
silent until the publication of its guidelines over a year later.
The background of the guidelines was revealed in the deposition of Ms.
Sonia P. Fuentes, the Chief of the Legislative Council Division of the
EEOC at the time the guidelines were promulgated.' 8 The Office of
Legislative Counsel is responsible for drafting rules, regulations, and guide-
lines in the area of sex discrimination.
In the deposition, Ms. Fuentes admitted that the EEOC had conducted
no medical studies concerning pregnancy prior to issuing the guidelines, 19
and that she was not aware of any financial studies conducted concerning
the monetary impact of the guidelines on industry. She testified that
she had no expertise in medicine, economics, or labor relations and that
she was assisted in drafting the guidelines by four other people, including
two law students. She also stated that no public hearings were held in
connection with the proposed guidelines.20
The EEOC is empowered to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural
regulations to carry out the provisions of Title VII.21 The Administra-
tive Procedure Act provides that when an agency proposes a rule, it
shall be published in the Federal Register, and notice must be given of the
sex and more or less to be anticipated during the working life of most
woman employees. Therefore, an insurance or other benefit plan may
simply exclude maternity as a covered risk, and such exclusion would not
in our view be discriminatory.
General Counsel Opinion Letter, Nov. 10, 1966. OCH E.P.G. 17,304.49. See also
Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 721.
16. EEOC Decision No. 70-360, 1973 CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6084 (Dec. 16,
1969).
17. EEOC Decision No. 71-1474, 1973 CCH EEOC DEcISIoNs f 6221 (Mar. 19,
1971).
18. Ms. Fuentes was deposed for the case of Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
2 CCH EMP. PRAcT. G. (7 EPD) 9154, at 6824 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1973).
19. See Brief for Delta Air Lines, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 25, Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Bd., 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974), containing an abstract of the
deposition.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 713(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970) which
provides 4
(a) The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue
... suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this sub-
chapter. Regulations issued under this section shall be in conformity with
the standards and limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act.
[Vol. 24:127
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time, place, and nature of the public rule proceedings so that interested
persons may comment. 22
The EEOC did not have to follow the procedure of allowing the public
to comment on the proposed guidelines prior to enactment because of
an exception to the general notice requirement. This exception applies
whenever an agency issues "interpretive rules" or "administrative inter-
pretations. '2 3  "Interpretive rules," which are exempt from the general
requirements of notice and opportunity for comment, have been defined
as those which clarify or explain existing laws or regulations, rather than
those which represent a substantial modification in or adoption of new
regulations. 24 Furthermore, the fact that an agency characterizes a rule
as "interpretive," which requires no notice and opportunity to comment,
rather than "substantive," where the converse is true, is not determinative
as to the nature of the regulation.25
Despite the facts that the EEOC had no empirical data upon which to
base the new guidelines, that the guidelines represented a "substantive"
modification in the EEOC position previously noted, and that the guide-
lines would have a substantial effect on industry, the EEOC gave no
notice of the proposed interpretation nor opportunity for public comment.
In its prefatory remarks to the guidelines the EEOC stated:
Because the material herein is interpretive in nature, the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of pro-
posed rule making, opportunity for public participation, and delay in
the effective date are inapplicable. 26
Thus, by labeling the guidelines "interpretive" in nature, the EEOC was
able to avoid the customary procedures. A review of the origin of the
new guidelines set out above raises the question of whether the EEOC
abused its administrative powers in promulgating the new guidelines.
THE GUIDELINES AND THE COURTS
The guidelines have been subjected to a number of direct judicial at-
tacks. In the leading case upholding their validity, Wetzel v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company,27 female employees challenged, inter alia,
the income protection plan of their employer. The Liberty Mutual Insur-
22. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
23. Id. at § 553(b) (A).
24. Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Del. 1970).
25. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942);
Pharmaceutical Mfg. Assoc. v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1970).
26. 37 Fed. Reg. 6836 (1973).
27. 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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ance Company provided its employees with a contributory insurance plan
for continuation of income for long term illness, defined as an illness re-
quiring treatment by a doctor for eight or more days and causing ab-
sence from work. The plan contained several exclusions: injuries or sick-
ness covered by workmen's compensation insurance, disability in excess of
104 weeks, and disability due to pregnancy. 28
The court, relying on the guidelines, found that the employer had
violated Title VII by failing to include pregnancy as a "disability" under
the plan. 29  Furthermore, it found that the employer was guilty of this
violation from and after July 2, 1965, the date on which the plan was
instituted, thereby exposing the employer to liability for pregnancy bene-
fits denied in the ensuing period.
The court's decision was based on its characterization of pregnancy.
In rejecting the defendant's argument that excluding pregnancy from
the income protection plan was "not sex discriminatory because preg-
nancy is 'sui generis' and thus subject to special treatment, '30 the court
responded:
Because pregnancy is a natural, expectable, and societally necessary
condition, which is certain to occur in a statistically predictable number
of women in the labor force, we see no merit in Defendant's argument
that it may be excluded from equality of treatment in conditions and
benefits of employment because it is a voluntary condition. Whether
voluntary or not, it occurs with certainty and regularity. 8'
Once pregnancy was placed outside the class of "truly voluntary" con-
ditions, the court had no problem finding discrimination because of sex
since conditions peculiar to males were included in the plan.
Pregnancy is the only disability, not within the other exceptions, not cov-
ered by the Income Protection Plan. Pregnancy is a condition limited to
women. Conditions limited to men, such as prostrate troubles, are not
excluded, nor is any exclusion provided for a number of illnesses whose
incidence among males is greatly predominant (i.e. gout 19 to 1; the
Merck Manual, 10th ed. 1961).32
The employer's contention that the cost of including pregnancy under
the plan would be prohibitive was also rejected by the court:
While cost may be a business purpose, and certainly to add pregnancy to
the insurance program will cost more, it can only be a defense in a Title
VII action where "... there exists an overriding legitimate business pur-
28. Id. at 1155.
29. Id. at 1162-63.
30. Id. at 1157.
31. Id. at 1158.
32. Id. at 1162.
[Vol. 24:127
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pose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation
of the business. Thus the business purpose must be sufficiently com-
pelling to overridge any racial impact, the challenged practice must ef-
fectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and there
must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish
it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact (footnotes omitted). 33
The court noted, with respect to the increased costs, that the company
had no duty to furnish any -benefits, but if it did so, there could be no
inequality on the basis of sex.
Ten days prior to the Wetzel decisions,34 the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia held for the employer by classifying
pregnancy as a healthy and normal occurrence. In Newmon v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc.,3 5 the plaintiffs challenged, inter alia, the employer's
denial of disability pay, sick leave pay, and other employment benefits
for the time they were absent from work during pregnancy and child-
birth. The court noted that there was a marked lack of criteria by
which to evaluate the employer's action under Title VII.as After noting
cases in which sex discrimination was found when members of both
sexes were similarly situated and one sex was denied benefits, the court
distinguished the instant case because the plaintiffs were not receiving dis-
parate treatment on the basis of sex.37
Upon finding that the only authority supporting the plaintiff's claims of
sex discrimination was the new guidelines, the court noted several of
the more questionable aspects of the rules. The new guidelines are in
33. Id. at 1162-63 (citation omitted).
34. In denying defendant's motion to reconsider, the Wetzel court acknowledged
and rejected Newmon: "[We disagree with the finding of [the Newmon] court that
pregnancy is not a 'disability.'" Id. at 1164.
35. Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2 CCH EMP. PRAcT. G. (7 EPD)
9154, at 6824 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1973).
36. The court was quite correct in stating that there is a dearth of material
specifically concerning pregnancy benefits. The subject has only been discussed as
an adjunct to other areas of interest under Title VII. For a representative sampling
see Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKcE L.J. 671, 721; Koontz, Childbirth and
Childrearing Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 N.Y.L.F. 480 (1971); Developments
in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VH o1 the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971); Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Con-
ceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 261, 283
(1972); Comment, Equal Protection and the Pregnancy Leave Case, 34 OHIo ST. L.J.
628 (1973); Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leaves for Teachers-The Equal Pro-
tection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 N.C.L.R. 768 (1973).
37. Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2 CCH EMP. PRAcr. G. (7 EPD) 9154,
at 6824 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1973).
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fact inconsistent with the EEOC's prior position and followed eight years
after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. The court also commented
that there was no factual basis upon which the guidelines were drawn
as discussed earlier in this Comment.
In rejecting plaintiff's interpretation of the EEOC guidelines, the court
rested its holding on a common sense interpretation of the facts pre-
sented at trial, stating:
Whether the plaintiff and her class are the victims of sex discrimination
depends on the definition of pregnancy.38
After considering all the evidence the court concluded that pregnancy was
not an illness or disability, since pregnancy, in most cases, is a volun-
tarily imposed condition, and the fact that a woman is pregnant indi-
cates that she is quite healthy and normal.39
The court reasoned that since pregnancy is not a sickness or disability,
exclusion of it from an employer's benefit plan covering sickness or illness
was not sexual discrimination. In rejecting the guidelines the court re-
lied on Griggs v. Duke Power Company,40 in which the United States
Supreme Court had held that while guidelines issued by an adminis-
trative agency are entitled to great deference, they are not legally bind-
ing on the court.41
The most damaging decision affecting the guidelines has arisen,
ironically, -from a case in which they were not directly in issue. In Gedul-
dig v. Aiello,42 the United States Supreme Court considered a challenge
to a statewide, employee funded disability program on the grounds that by
not including normal pregnancies in its coverage, the plan violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.48 The California
program was self supporting (i.e. required no state subsidy), and was
funded by mandatory deductions from employee wages. The plan ex-
cluded benefits for several categories of disabilities: certain short term
disabilities defined by statute; drug addiction and sexual psychopathy
resulting in court commitment; and disabilities resulting from normal preg-
38. Id. at 6830.
39. Id.
40. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
41. Id. at 433-34.
42. 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974).
43. The actions challenging the exclusion of pregnancy and related complications
from the plan were initially brought by four women, three of whom had abnormal
pregnancies. The case of the three with abnormal pregnancies became moot as the
litigation evolved, since the California plan was amended to allow benefits for
abnormal pregnancies. Id. at 2489. See Rentzer v. California Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (2d App. Dist. 1973),
[Vol. 24:127
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nancies, up to the termination of pregnancy and 28 days thereafter.
The Court was confronted with evidence of the extraordinary addi-
tional cost to the program of including pregnancy benefits. 44 In order
to accommodate these benefits the Court recognized that the state would
either have to require an increase in contributions by employees, provide
assistance in the form of a subsidy, or reduce the compensation for the
disabilities already included under the plan.
In deciding that the plan did not violate the equal protection clause,
the Court found that the state had legitimate interests which it sought
to protect through the exclusion of pregnancy benefits: (1) "maintain-
ing the self-supporting nature of its insurance program"; (2) "distributing
the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an
adequate level for disabilities that are covered"; and (3) "maintaining
the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly burden [lower-income
employees]." 45
The dissenting opinion rejected the majority's view that the exclusion of
pregnancy benefits rationally promoted legitimate state cost-saving in-
terests and found that the plan discriminated on the basis of sex. Justice
Brennan noted that the plan denied compensation for disabilities which
could affect only women. In his view
by singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability
peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability
compensation: a limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which
women workers may recover, while men receive full compensation for all
disabilities suffered .... In effect, one set of rules is applied to females
and another to males. Such dissimilar treatment of men and women, on
the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, in-
evitably constitutes sex discrimination.46
Justice Brennan felt that since the plan constituted a legislative classifi-
cation on the basis of gender, it involved a "suspect" classification and
therefore there had to be a showing of an overriding or compelling state
interest to sustain the plan. In his view, the state interest in preserv-
ing the fiscal integrity of the plan was not a sufficient justification. Further,
he noted that the plan violated the EEOC 'guidelines concerning the treat-
ment of pregnancy-related disabilities. 47
44. The state estimated that the increased cost of including benefits for normal
pregnancies would range between $120.2 million and $131 million annually, while the
plaintiffs contended that the cost would be $48.9 million per year. 94 S. Ct. at
2490 n.18.
45. Id. at 2491-92.
46. 94 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis added).
47. 94 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
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The majority opinion, however, squarely rejected the dissenting view
that because only women can become pregnant, any classification con-
cerning pregnancy is inevitably sex-based, stating:
[Wihile it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification .... 48
The majority then proceeded to define normal pregnancy, refusing to
identify it with sex. According to the Court:
[N]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving preg-
nancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such
as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.4 9
In addition, the Court found no sex discrimination in the selection of risks
insured by the program, because there was no risk from which the over-
all group of males were protected and females were not. Rather the
program
divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes. 50
Since the plan provided equal benefits for disabilities suffered by the
group of nonpregnant persons (males and females), it did not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex when it denied benefits to the group of pregnant
persons (exclusively females).
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Geduldig in terms of the guide-
lines is the definition of normal pregnancy and the manner in which it
may be treated in a disability program. Although the majority did not
specifically refer to the guidelines, it may have impliedly invalidated the
guidelines by finding that normal pregnancy is not to be identified with
sex, and that it may be included or excluded from a disability plan on
any reasonable basis similar to any other physical condition without dis-
criminating on the basis of sex.
This interpretation of Geduldig was relied upon in a recent case in-
volving two class action suits brought under Title VII, the authority for
the guidelines. In Communications Workers of America v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,5t the Federal District Court for the Southern
48. 94 S. Ct. at 2482 n.20.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. 2 CCH EMP. PRAcr. G. (8 EPD) 9615, at 5637 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1974).
[Vol. 24:127
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District of New York dismissed the suits based upon its interpretation of
Geduldig.
In each class action the plaintiff employees contended that the de-
fendants, private and municipal employers, were guilty of sex discri-
mination in violation of Title VII and the guidelines because the em-
ployers' benefit plans did not provide benefits for pregnancy related
disabilities.
The plaintiffs contended that the Geduldig decision was inapplicable
to a Title VII action because it involved a social welfare policy created
by a state, and that deference is customarily to be shown to legislative
judgments on social welfare matters. The instant cases, they argued,
involved private and municipal employers and therefore no such deference
was warranted under Title VII.
In rejecting this argument the court found that the threshold question,
as well as the prerequisite to recovery under Title VII, was the determina-
tion whether the exclusion of pregnancy benefits constituted sex dis-
crimination.
[It is a question of] whether disparity between pregnancy related disabili-
ties and other disabilities can be classified as discrimination on the basis
of sex. If, as footnote 20 [of Geduldig] seems to suggest, it cannot be so
classified, then the further question of whether such disparity is justified-
or less justifiable [sic] in the employment context than in some other con-
text-can never be reached.5 2
Based upon this interpretation of Geduldig, that such disparate treatment
of pregnancy related disabilities does not constitute discrimination on
the basis of sex, the court found that the plaintiffs had no cause of
action for sex discrimination under Title VII.
The court then dismissed the two actions with leave to replead, but
certified to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the question
whether Geduldig
has established-for the purposes of these actions or either of them-that
disparity between the treatment of pregnancy-related and other disabilities
does not of itself constitute discrimination on the basis of sex (or gender)
within the prohibition either of Title VII or of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.53
Although at the time of this writing the court of appeals has not ruled
on this question, it is apparent that the Geduldig decision has clearly put in
issue the validity of the guidelines.
As the above cases indicate, the stage is set for an Armageddon be-
52. Id. at 5639 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 5640.
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tween the various factions confronting each other over the issue of preg-
nancy benefits. It appears that the EEOC, although intending to reach an
admittedly salutory result, exceeded its powers as an administrative agency
in promulgating the new guidelines. Further, the guidelines do not elim-
inate sexual discrimination because, as the Supreme Court has indicated,
no sexual discrimination occurs when pregnancy benefits are denied unless
there is "a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pre-
texts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members
of one sex or the other. .. .
BUSINESS NECESSITY AND COSTS AS A DEFENSE TO
DENIAL OF BENEFITS
Even if the Supreme Court's holding in Geduldig, disassociating the
exclusion of pregnancy benefits from sex discrimination, cannot be ex-
tended to private employers, 55 the recognized exception of "business
necessity" and the cost of providing the additional benefits remain. While
the EEOC guidelines provide that cost shall not be a defense to sexually
discriminatory practices, 56 numerous cases have sanctioned disparate
treatment where "business necessity" or cost is involved.
Although the business necessity exception has received its greatest
recognition in the area of racial discrimination under Title VII, the basic
principles are applicable to sex discriminaton. Under this judicially
54. Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S. Ct. 2485, 2492 n.20 (1974). But see note 55
infra.
55. The Geduldig decision was based on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment which requires state action. The guidelines are based on
Title VII which does not have the same requirement and is applicable to private
employers. The issue is whether acts of alleged sex discrimination, while permissible
under the equal protection clause when public employers are involved, can be illegal
under Title VII when private employers are involved. For example, in the area of
racial discrimination, the Supreme Court cases indicate that for a classification
scheme to violate the equal protection clause, the classification must involve race
on its face, while an employment practice can violate Title VII by a showing of
discriminatory impact. Compare Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), with
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Also, a classification based on
sex could be constitutional under the equal protection clause if it has a rational
basis or serves a compelling state interest (depending upon whether sex is a "suspect
class"). The same classification could be impermissible under Title VII which has
been said to allow only more stringent "defenses." See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1159-60 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1973) provides:
(e) It shall not be a defense under title VIII [sic] to a charge of sex dis-
crimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to
one sex than another.
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created exception courts have allowed racially discriminatory policies to
continue where "there is an overriding legitimate, non-racial business
purpose. '57  In Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States58 the
court presented the business necessity exception in terms of a hypothetical.
An employer could require that all applicants for the position of secre-
tary be able to type. Although the effect of this might be that certain
racial groups could not fulfill the position due to lack of qualifications,
there would be no racial discrimination because the employer has an
economic purpose. The employer has a legitimate business necessity
and cannot be required to undergo the added expense of hiring unquali-
fied individuals to redress the racial imbalance.
The requirements of business necessity were further defined in Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corporation."9 Although the court found the employer's
departmental seniority system to be racially discriminatory, it recognized
that in certain circumstances business necessity could justify continued
racial discrimination where
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice
is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus the
business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial
impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business
purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable
alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the busi-
ness purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser dif-
ferential racial impact.60
Further, the court stated that although dollar cost alone was not de-
terminative, considerations of economy were relevant in determining the
existence of business necessity. 6 '
As the above cases indicate, when an employer has an overriding busi-
ness purpose for his practices, of which cost is a relevant factor, and
there is no acceptable alternative, he may continue a practice which
has a racially discriminatory impact. In applying this same rationale
to sexual discrimination in pregnancy benefits, an employer might be able
to claim this same exception. The employer has an overriding business
purpose; namely, to maintain the fiscal integrity of his business while
providing benefits for disability or illness which employees of both sexes
can enjoy at a reasonable cost to himself. The cost of providing the added
57. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
58. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
59. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
I60. d. at 798 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 799 n.8.
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pregnancy benefits is appreciable in terms of overall fiscal integrity of
the business. Finally, he has no acceptable alternative: he must either
incur the added expenses himself and jeopardize the entire business ven-
ture; or he can proportionately limit the disability or illness benefits
presently being offered to employees of both sexes in order to absorb
the additional costs. The latter alternative may be impossible to do
unilaterally if he has agreed to a certain level of benefits under an exist-
ing contract and he is dealing with a strong labor organization. Since
the first of the employer's alternatives is unreasonable in terms of cost,
and the second appears unfeasible, he might be able to claim business
necessity as a justification for the exclusion of pregnancy benefits.
In addition to the business necessity exception recognized under Title
VII recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that
the cost of providing benefits may be a relevant factor in excusing dis-
crimination. Although Dandridge v. Williams,62 Jefferson v. Hackney, 3
and Geduldig v. Aiello64 involved challenges to state welfare benefit plans
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Court's rationale could possibly be applicable to an employer's allocation
of the limited funds he has available to provide employee benefits.
In Dandridge the Court sustained Maryland's allocation of its available
welfare funds, although this plan meant that certain families' received pro-
portionately lower per capita benefits. The Court recognized that the
state 'had a finite amount of funds and that it had to distribute them in
such a way as to meet the needs of the largest possible number of fami-
lies. Further, the Court stated:
[T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state of-
ficials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public
welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients. 65
Similarly, in Jefferson, the Court upheld the Texas plan for distribution
of its funds among four welfare programs, although one of the programs
received proportionately lower funds than the other three. The Court
noted that so long as a state's judgment is rational and not invidious, its
efforts to "tackle the problems of the poor and needy are not subject to
a constitutional straight-jacket."6 6
Most recently in Geduldig, the Court upheld California's disability
insurance under an equal protection attack which excluded from its cover-
62. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
63. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
64. 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974).
65. 397 U.S. at 487.
66. 406 U.S. at 547.
[Vol. 24:127
1.974] CURRENT TRENDS IN PREGNANCY BENEFITS 141
age, disabilities due to normal pregnancy. The Court stated
[A] State may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.67
The Court found the legislature 'had "rationally" excluded normal preg-
nancy as a disability under the plan68 as the "State has a legitimate in-
terest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program." 69
A private employer, albeit on a much reduced scale, is faced with the
same dilemma as the states in Dandridge, Jefferson and Geduldig; he
has a limited amount of funds to provide employee benefits. If he opts
to expend these resources for benefits which both sexes can potentially
receive (sick leave due to unexpected illness, natural illness, or accidental
injury; medical and hospital care for accidental injury or sudden illness)
while excluding those which only one sex can directly receive (pregnancy
benefits), has he not complied with the criteria sanctioned in Dandridge,
Jefferson, and Geduldig, although there may be sex discrimination? Thus
it can be argued that an employer complies with the law when he attempts
such an allocation of his available funds.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the Supreme Court will be faced with a difficult
decision if it is ultimately faced with resolving the conflict over the guide-
lines. The Court will have to determine whether the guidelines repre-
sent an abuse of EEOC's rule making power; whether the denial of preg-
nancy benefits is sex discrimination as prohibited by Title VII; and
finally, whether a denial of benefits can be justifed under either a busi-
ness necessity or cost argument. The Court may refuse to rule on the
guidelines, preferring to wait until Congress enacts one of the pending na-
tional health care plans, 70 all of which contain various provisions covering
the expenses of maternity and childbirth.
In summary, the above discussion of the guidelines indicates that the
EEOC was attempting to correct a situation which, when involving a
67. 94 S. Ct. at 2491, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955). Although not referred to in the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan specifically cited the EEOC's guidelines in finding the State's in-
surance program worked an invidious discrimination. 94 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
68. See note 43 supra.
69. 94 S. Ct. at 2491.
70. See (H.R. 13870, S. 3286) proposed Comprehensive National Health In-
surance Act of 1974, introduced by Representative Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.) and
Senator Theodore Kennedy (D-Mass.); (H.R. 12684, S. 2970) proposed Compre-
hensive Health Insurance Act of 1974 (Administration bill), introduced by Repre-
sentative Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.), Representative Herman Schneebeli (R-Pa.), and
Senator Robert Packwood (R-Ore.).
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state, the Supreme Court has held not to violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is apparent that the EEOC at-
tempted corrective action in a hastily enacted, poorly planned, and some-
what arbitrary fashion.
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